

to the other moment, the pragmatic I, the egoic type of knowing and understanding. This ambiguity can of course lead to difficulties. It is our job in our psychological work to make it clear to ourselves which "soul" is meant in each specific context, without, however, in our theorizing trying to split the unity of the two for the sake of unambiguity, for example by using two different names. The contradiction and equivocation must not be avoided. It is inherent in the psychological notion of soul.

3.9 THE PSYCHOLOGICAL I

I mentioned in the previous section that the soul as the one moment of itself (itself in the sense of the whole psychological difference) is the organ of truth or the historical locus that stirs as the burrowing spirit Mercurius in the *great* people, in artists and thinkers. But this not-I can have an additional form of realization, namely as the subject of *psychology* or as psychology as a subject. We can call this the psychological I. Whereas the soul that stirs in the great people has event or fact character (it happens to stir of its own accord in this or that person and at this or that moment, or it doesn't make itself felt in him or not at this time; its manifestation is unpredictable), the psychological I is a methodological standpoint, a style of thinking and apperceiving, of interpreting and appreciating, which as such can to some extent be learned and cultivated and even, but only to some extent, be employed or rejected at will. It, too, requires of course a certain aptitude, but it is not reserved for the truly great.

The psychological I is the standpoint of true psychology, the discipline of a soulful approach or reaction to phenomena, (1) in contrast to a soulless, technical, cynical, rationalistic, merely pragmatic approach, (2) in contrast to egoic emotionality, sentimentality, nostalgia, as well as (3) in contrast to an ideology-ridden theory, a subjective wish, need, and quest-driven view of things. Psychology is not in quest of anything. It does not want anything. Inasmuch as the psychological I is the standpoint of true psychology, it is not "my" I, but an *objective* I, *its* (psychology's) I or psychology as the I. This is a very important point. I am a psychologist *to the extent that* psychology—its methodological frame of mind—is at work in me. Psychology has to be the subject that is doing the psychologist's

seeing, thinking, and feeling, *not* he or she themselves. I already discussed earlier that psychology is the modern form of the former soul. Keeping this in mind we understand that only if psychology is the truly active subject in us is there a possibility that soul-making and awareness or recognition of soul can happen: because only like can know and produce like.

So in psychology we always have to ask ourselves *who* in us experiences. Who is doing the thinking? We know this type of question from Hillman's *Re-Visioning Psychology*. However, his question took the Who? to mean "which God?" This is very different from my "Who?," which is not, like Hillman's, about a *substantiated* third person singular or plural, about god or gods, but really about the first person singular, that is to say, about *my* (human) methodological standpoint. Is what I am doing truly psychology or maybe not at all? As who do I apperceive? As ego—or as "soul"? As civil man, empirical man—or as the psychological standpoint, as psychology?

And this question is not so much merely a question about a fact to be established, but much rather also an invitation or exhortation to *perform* an act, namely the act of self-negation, self-sublation, of departure from myself as conventional I (ego) and civil man, the act of (logically, not positive-factually) going under as civil man. It is in this spirit that I once wrote about psychological discourse: "It has to *be as* the negation of the ego, and the psychologist ... has to speak as one who has long died as ego personality. The art of psychological discourse is to speak as someone already deceased. ... Psychology has to occur in the spirit of logical negativity."²²⁹

What I described has essential consequences for the conception of the psychological I. It must not be comprehended as an always available part of the personality or a permanent quality of consciousness. The question—"Who? or as who do I apperceive? As ego or as 'soul?'"—must not be taken to imply that we could simply switch from the one to other or that the soul standpoint could simply be switched on. Rather, the psychological I is a product, a result. In order to exist, it has to be *produced*, and produced each time "from scratch," so to speak: *soul-making*. In the sciences we have certain methods and approaches

²²⁹ W. Giegerich, *The Soul's Logical Life*, 2nd ed., Frankfurt/Main et al. (Peter Lang) 1999, p. 24.

that one has to learn once and for all and that thereafter merely need to be *applied*. They can, so to speak, be switched on. In psychology this is fundamentally different. Regardless of what topic or matter one's psychological work turns to, no matter what is to be studied psychologically (this dream, this myth, this symptom or neurosis, etc.), in each instance the whole point of the psychological work is to produce the psychological standpoint, the psychological I. This is the goal of the work. The whole purpose of psychology (the psychological *opus*) is to *produce* psychology. Soul-making is psychology-making, and psychology-making is soul-making, i.e., the establishing and further-development, further deepening, of the psychological level in everything one studies. Psychology does not aim for theoretical knowledge about the soul, for a kind of scientific doctrine, new information. The psychological standpoint or perspective is itself that *lapis* that it tries to reach. It is precisely not merely the perspective or method (tool) through which the psychological work is done. Psychology or the psychological I is its own goal, it has its purpose within itself. Here we can remember Jung's already cited statement that "the alchemists came very close to realizing that the ego [*das Ich*] was the mysteriously elusive arcane substance and the longed-for lapis" (CW 14 § 131). The goal of psychology is (psychology's) self-production in the spirit of sameness. The goal is not some other outside of itself (not healing, self-development, one's own wholeness and individuation, nor gaining reliable knowledge about the soul). Sameness. No otherness, no external purpose. This is all: giving reality to itself. Proving its (psychology's) existence and proving it only through the deed (*opus*) of fabricating that which it wants to prove as existing.

This means that the psychological I has in itself *opus* and (produced) Work character, it *is* only to the extent that it is *made*. But this in turn means that it exists only in the actual doing, in the performance, to speak in alchemical metaphors: in the adept's ongoing *ars*, in other words, only "momentary." Soul-making is not like building a house. It is more like eating which also does not produce a permanent result. You have to do it again and again, if you want it to happen. The sciences are again different. Scientific methods are the tool for achieving purposes external to themselves. They aim for and

produce permanent results (reliable knowledge) independent of the particular way these results were achieved. The insights gained can therefore be generalized and applied to other instances of the same type. In order to use it one does not need to know how exactly penicillin was discovered. Theoretical insights or conclusions last beyond the time and exist outside of the experiments or studies through which they were achieved, and they retain their significance beyond the time of their production (at least until future experiments will disprove or supersede them. But even if they are disproved, they nevertheless last, namely as erroneous hypotheses or opinions in the history of science). Theoretical insights are logically "positive" items; you can transmit them to others in scientific journals or books. But the psychological I is "negative." It is not an item. It comes into being, and exists only, in that mind that actually performs the *opus* of absolute-negative inwardization and exists only for the duration of this inwardization. Whereas *aurum vulgi* can be given as a present to others or can be turned into coins with which you can buy things, *aurum nostrum* cannot be bartered. It IS its own time. If psychology comes up with insights that correspond to scientific knowledge, these are not truly psychological, but at best byproducts, as important and valid that they may be in other (for example, technical) regards.

With each new psychological investigation one always starts out from an external point of view and as civil man, as ordinary consciousness. And each time anew one has to work oneself into whatever happens to be one's prime matter and, by working oneself into its depth, into its interiority (i.e., by going under into the matter), create the *lapis*, the alchemical gold, the tincture: the psychological I. The psychologist has to conquer anew the psychological level for himself each time that he enters into the *opus*. But if this is so, if the psychological standpoint is the goal and final result of the psychological *opus*, I seem to have contradicted my starting point: my insistence that from the outset it has to be the psychological I or the soul that has to do the work. However, here we have to keep in mind that the life of the soul is self-contradictory, uroboric, dialectical. That the psychological I needs to be produced as the result of the *opus* and the fact that it has to be what from the beginning undertakes the *opus* is not a simple, undialectical contradiction. Rather, we have to realize

that the psychologist is only a psychologist to the extent that he is already pregnant with the psychological I from the outset. He as civil man and ordinary consciousness already has to be reached by it, in the grip of it, so that it is the true subject that does the thinking in him, if through the opus he wants to arrive at it. For only unto everyone that hath shall be given. If the psychological I, the alchemical Mercurius, is not the spiritus rector of the work from the start, the Mercurius will not be found. Only like can apperceive and produce like. There is no way from outside psychology into psychology. The psychological level is its own alpha and omega, its beginning and telos. No otherness. But conversely, the Mercurius needs to be *found*. The soul needs to *make* itself. Being pregnant with the psychological I does not mean already having been born as psychological I.

So when before I spoke of “fabricating” the psychological I, this word should not be taken in the sense of ego constructions or concoctions. Rather, we should read this word as referring to the *opus*, which in turn can be understood as the “labor” that is the prerequisite of a birth (and the way in which the birth happens), namely the birth of that which one before was merely pregnant with. A mother does not make the baby, but she nevertheless “pro-duces” the baby that she carried within herself all along. Birth is, as it were, only the *child's* move from “implicit” to “explicit,” but this move of the child involves the active labor, and labor pains, of the mother. Soul-making is the soul's or psychology's making itself in the sense of giving birth to itself. But for in fact taking place it also involves and requires our active “labor,” our human efforts, our *opus*—what Hegel called the *Anstrengung des Begriffs*, a phrase that has been translated into English as “labor of the concept.” This translation allows us to read it in terms of the birth metaphor. It is both the self-unfolding of the concept and the human labor of re-enacting in one's mind and comprehending this self-unfolding.

I will now summarily list in all brevity some of the most important principles and characteristics of the methodological standpoint of psychology, without each time paying attention to the starting-point/result dialectic just discussed. It will be a description of the psychological standpoint *from an external observer standpoint* and thus rather abstract, a talking *about* it. It should not be confused with “the

real thing.” The real psychological I only shows itself in the actual opus. I will here not need to go into each principle or characteristic at more length because I have discussed those principles numerous times at different occasions in my other works and in part already in other chapters of the present work.

- In looking at phenomena of real life and at texts and images one's presupposition has to be that in them “the soul” is speaking about *itself* (and not about us human beings or anything else in the world) and, furthermore, that there is *nothing behind* this the soul's speaking about itself: no substrate, not a positively existing soul as author, no eminent origin or beginning, nothing antecedently given (like a “primordial mother, the sensory, the natural, the physical” [Hillman]).²³⁰ The speaking or self-display is all there is (“actuality,” immanentism). Production without a producer. And a speaking without external referent. Since it has no external referent, this speaking cannot be compared with a referent as to whether it is adequate (true, correct) or not. The idea of an *adaequatio rei et intellectus* does not make sense here. “... there are still people who believe that a psychoanalyst could be lied to by his patients. But this is quite impossible. Lies are fantasies. And we treat fantasies” (CW 4 § 300 fn., transl. modif.). Soul phenomena have to be seen as an *arrangement* (in Alfred Adler's sense), a performance, self-display, a *mise en scène*. One has to view phenomena as having everything they need within themselves, including their own origin (cause or “author”), their final telos, and their meaning (and “referent”). They *are* their own referent. One has to view them strictly as self-relation, self-representation, self-interpretation. They *are* their own origin and author. Whether true or lies, whether good or bad, enjoyable or despicable like “stinking water,” symptoms, and the “*massa confusa*”: they are *causa sui*, and “sufficient unto

²³⁰ This negation includes even such “factors” or “dominants” as Jung's archetypes (if they are viewed as “factors” in the literal sense of the word) or Hillman's “Gods” and “the imaginal.”

[themselves], like the Uroboros, the tail-eater, which is said to beget, kill, and devour itself" (CW 16 § 454). They within themselves *produce* their own a priori only as their a posteriori *result*. As such they have their own *inner infinity* and are in the logical status of *selves*, of individuals.²³¹ (Please remember: we are here and in the following points merely discussing *methodological* presuppositions or imputations and not making ontological assertions. Only hypothetically: *if* one wants to do psychology, one has to view things this way. But nobody is required to do psychology and view things this way.)

²³¹ Jung (a) substantiated and reified "*the Self*" as a separate archetypal reality and (b) attributed it to people as each individual's Self. He thought (c) that only through a long individuation process could the Self—perhaps—be realized and that its experience was something special. What I am suggesting is the very different idea that being a self is the (c) inevitable and a priori (a) character or logical form of (b) all manifestations of soul, all soul phenomena themselves. Only to the extent that also people *are* soul, are they, too, selves. They don't have a self, they are selves. Something similar applies to the concept of *wholeness*. Jung viewed wholeness as a goal to be striven for. For me, wholeness is a methodological *presupposition*. If soul phenomena *are* uroboric, then as a matter of course they all start out as being in the state of "wholeness." Psychologically, each matter, each phenomenon has to be placed into and enclosed in the retort. But about the retort Jung himself said, "As the *vas Hermeticum* of alchemy, it was 'hermetically' sealed (i.e., sealed with the sign of Hermes); it had to be made of glass, and had also to be as round as possible, since it was meant to represent the cosmos [*das Weltall*, the All], in which the earth was created" (CW 13 § 245). This means nothing else than that *for psychology* each phenomenon is, for the time of its being our subject-matter, a world unto itself, the *whole* world, the one and only world, the All. This is it! Eachness. The retort, especially with its hermetic seal, is the image of wholeness by radically excluding the very idea of anything external, indeed, of externality as such. Jung also quotes alchemists saying, "Nature is not improved save through its own nature" and "Thus our material cannot be improved save through itself." And he mentions "the repeated warning of other treatises not to mix anything from outside with the contents of the Hermetic vessel, because the *lapis* 'has everything it needs.'" (CW 9ii § 220). Nature "rejoices in its own nature; if it is joined to another, the work of nature is destroyed" (CW 9ii § 244). As with "self" and "wholeness," so Jung also literalized and ontologized "the individual," identifying this term with and reserving it for each subsisting human being. This is why he had to construe "individuation" as the process of people's self-development, whereas psychologically it should be the "alchemical" process of releasing each prime matter, each soul phenomenon, into its truth ("improving nature through its own nature," i.e., the move from "implicit" to "explicit"). In all three cases Jung did not go all the way through with his own concept of the objective psyche and with the immanentism implied by his own alchemical teachings, but in the last analysis kept clinging to the substrate personality and thus to externality. That he tied psychological thinking to the human person as substrate means that he did not use the *vas Hermeticum*! Psychic phenomena had for him their *ground* outside themselves in the human being, and this is why "wholeness," "Self," and "individuation" had to become for his theorizing hard-to-achieve future *goals*, i.e., utopian.

- Viewing things this way means that one sees them *from within* and no longer from outside, from an observer standpoint (This is why Jung rejected the idea of an Archimedean point for psychology.) No vis-à-vis, no immediacy. Psychological work has to follow a logic of sameness. No otherness, no exteriority, that is, nothing outside of any phenomenon (only possibly an internal other, the Other of itself). Practically, for example in psychotherapy, this means that psychology happens when what at first seems to be an other is not viewed as a totally other; when the seeming "facts" of a patient's biography and pathology, etc., (as "predicate") become interiorized into the "(sentence) subject" (= the interiority of the suffering soul) as its self-display. That is to say, the patient's statements, sentences, have to be read as "*analytic judgments*" and not as a "synthetic judgments."²³² Conversely we can say that we enter the sphere of ordinary and scientific world-experience when we read the "predicates" as those of a "synthetic judgment." Because then the predicates (the statements, the phenomena) become "facts" for us that refer to an external referent, in our case, the patient.—One sees here that psychology is a kind of island or oasis within the modern world, an oasis which gives asylum²³³ to the ancient metaphysical logic of identity, of the copula, vinculum, ligamentum, or coniunctio, and of the syzygial unity of the unity and difference of the opposites, however asylum only as *reduced to the form and status of a mere methodological approach*, not as an ontology or belief system, not as a worldview or doctrine for mankind at large. Psychology is *sublated* metaphysics, irrevocably *sublated* metaphysics. But also *sublated metaphysics*. Psychology has no higher status and collective significance than has a hobby or

²³² I refer here the reader to the more detailed discussion of this topic by Greg Mogensson, "Interiorizing Psychology into Itself," in: W. Giegerich, D.L. Miller, G. Mogensson, *Dialectics & Analytical Psychology*, New Orleans, LA (Spring Journal Books) 2005, pp. 61–75, here esp. pp. 66–71.

²³³ Concerning this asylum cf also the last sentence of ch. 3.4.

pastime.²³⁴ Just as hobby and pastime have their place in the private life of individuals, so psychology has its place only in the interiority, the hidden recesses, of the individuals' private soul. When psychology loses this humility and forgets about this its sublatedness (for example, by claiming to have an immediate real, "official," and public significance for this age and for society at large, possibly even propagating it as a salvationist scheme for individuals and the culture at large), it turns into an ideology.²³⁵ New Age esotericism, pop psychology. Psychology is the discipline of Mnemosyne. Its tense is the perfect tense. No future. The owl of Minerva begins its flight at dusk. This insistence on the sublatedness aspect is the one caution. The other is: when, conversely, psychology forgets about its being "metaphysics," it loses its soul and "the soul," turning into Lange's "psychology without soul.")

- But being in this way *within* also implies that our habitual *object consciousness* is overcome. Only from the external observer standpoint does what we are concerned with take on the logical form of objects or thinglike-ness. Once inside, one is within a *speaking*, a living *meaning*, a concept,

²³⁴ By saying this I do not wish to deny the obvious fact that there are professional psychology and the practice of psychotherapy (which, neither for the analyst nor for the patient is a pastime!). My point is that we must not give to soul-work a higher quasi-metaphysical, quasi-religious significance, higher than, for example, to one's enjoying a Bach oratorio. Nor does it have the dignity of *necessity* that industry, banking, commerce have. It is a luxury, and even more so than the humanities which, other than soul-work, are not of merely private significance.

²³⁵ When Freud stated that "Drive theory is our mythology" (and with the same right he could have said the same thing about the Oedipus complex, the "family romance," "object-relations," and all sorts of other components of psychoanalytic theory), he inadvertently admitted that psychoanalysis is in the business of myth-making, ideology-making, and that the application of psychoanalytic theory in the consulting room is the project of a ritual cocooning patients in this modern "myth." The same applies to much of Jungian psychology. The theories of "individuation," of the ego-self axis, of typology, of the heroic ego, of the terrible one-sidedness of both Christianity and the modern world in need of being healed by a striving for "wholeness," etc., are, the way they are used, simply ideologies. And what many Jungians are doing in psychotherapy is to *mindlessly* act out those theories upon one patient after another willing to be cocooned in a "myth", as well as, in publications, to act those same theories out in the interpretation of innocent, helpless symbols, fairy tales, and genuine myths of old.

within a particular manifestation of the sphere of intelligibility. What from outside would show itself as an image object or idea object, reveals itself as itself a priori *being* text, being interpretation (rather than being an object *to be* interpreted). Not a fact of nature, but a certain "statement," "thesis," or "opinion" (about itself), a notion, conception: one of "the soul's" self-interpretations. Psychology tries to interpret *interpretations*.

- The phenomenally appearing meaning or interpretation is alive, is logical life, i.e., a self-moving dynamic "finally," "teleologically" aiming for its full self-unfolding and, through this relentless self-unfolding, for its own exhaustion (and thus ultimately even its own self-overcoming). There is a hidden animating logic at work inside each phenomenon, a "burrowing spirit," alchemy's spirit Mercurius, which, as long as the conscious mind has not entered it or has not, conversely, been truly reached or wounded by it, lies dormant (much like the Kundalini in its initial state), but awakens and comes alive the moment a real contact has been established. *Oportet me adesse*. It needs our dedication, our commitment, our bringing our presence to bear on it.²³⁶ What was implicit in the first immediacy in which a phenomenon, image, or idea originally appeared wants to become explicit, "spelled out" (which, if completely achieved, would at once mean that the life or soul has gone out of it; that *this* phenomenon has become psychologically obsolete, a fact which Jung in his theorizing discussed under the heading of "the death of symbols").
- Psychology must adopt the standpoint of the objective psyche and view phenomena *sub specie* or in terms of the

²³⁶ Jung, to be sure, saw this necessity when he demanded that we *enter* our fantasies ("active imagination"), but his solution is sadly deficient. It remains itself a mere fantasy, because this entering is only a semantic one, on the narrative level. As an (imagined) literal act and behavior of entering, it is only a token entering. A real, committed entering, by contrast, would require that it happens as a syntactical one, that is, in the very logic informing consciousness (the logical form of consciousness).

objective psyche and its concerns, we could also say: view phenomena *from* "the other side" or from within. This presupposes a translocation away from the ordinarily prevailing viewpoints. Psychology, in order to *be*, must *have left* the usual (common-sensical, pragmatic, utilitarian,²³⁷ emotional, moral, scientific) categories and interests behind so that it can see things how they are, as Jung put it, "in Mercurio," in the "archetypal background," in "the psyche's hinterland," not in empirical-factual reality. Only in this way does psychology do justice to the psychological difference that constitutes it. What we have to see in psychology is "that behind the impressions of the daily life—behind the scenes—another picture looms up, covered by a thin veil of actual facts."²³⁸ This other picture is what psychology has to focus on. The alchemist Dorneus similarly said, "There is in natural things a certain truth not seen by the outward eye but perceived by the mind alone. Of this the philosophers had experience..." (CW 11 § 152 note 47).

- It is clear that this focus requires a certain indirectness, which I will briefly explain. As a matter of course, psychology has to concentrate on the empirical phenomena, on what really shows itself, like the real pathology, the real symptoms, the real sandplay pictures, the real dreams, the real great cultural works. But it concentrates on them as the logically negative expression or representation of their own internal other, which is the actual subject-matter that psychology wants to study, their inner negativity, the soul, the spirit Mercurius. But psychology cannot study the "Mercurius" directly because the "Mercurius" does not exist as a positivity in the first place. It can only be studied indirectly through looking at how it manifests itself positively in and as empirical

²³⁷ This includes all interests and wishes of "the ego," such as those for our survival, benefit, protection, and consolation. Such interests are, of course, not wrong or bad. They only must not influence the psychological approach.

²³⁸ C.G. Jung, *The Visions Seminars*, Zürich (Spring Publ.) 1976, p. 8.

phenomena. It is vital for psychology to understand this dialectic. You look at the phenomenal in order to see something else! So you have to truly devote yourself to the phenomenal and yet at the same time *not* intend it as your object. It is an in itself negated focusing on the matter (*ein wegblickendes Hinblicken*, an intently looking at the object that nevertheless, while one solely looks at it, is a looking away). This looking is therefore self-contradictory. It has to be this, because a direct gaze at it would tend to get stuck in the empirical and pragmatic surface appearance of the phenomenon, its merely formalistic-functional or its immediate aesthetic aspects. It would be a seeing with the outward eye and not with the mind. The whole-hearted dedication to a phenomenon requires a stepping-back of the subjective mind, indeed even its going-under (going-under into the phenomenon), so that the true inner substance of the phenomenon (the soul of the real) may come to the fore.

- This translocation also includes the insight that the soul is not about us, about people. For example, not I as civil man must individuate. Individuation in Jung's sense is not people's task (even if, deplorably, Jung usually presented it that way). The subject to undergo individuation is (if we focus on "man") the "archetypal" Purusha, Anthropos, or Adam kadmon, or, less imaginally speaking, the *Concept* of man, the logic of man's self-definition and mode of being-in-the-world. But more generally it is the self-fulfillment of each psychic phenomenon studied, its coming home to itself, its being released into its truth, its concept. Alchemically speaking, it is the freeing of the spirit Mercurius imprisoned in the matter. The move from implicit to explicit. It is a naive and narcissistic mistake to take oneself so seriously as to confuse oneself with the true subject of the soul's life (what or whom it is about). *We* are no more than the stage or place where *it* happens, but where it happens for its own sake, not for ours. The fact that it needs us to acquire a *real* presence in the world and

undergo its process of *further-determination* must not go to our heads as if we were meant.

- Doing psychology thus demands also that we have gained a distance from ourselves, have departed from ourselves as ego-personalities. This is a much greater and more real blow to “the naive self-love of men” and the “human megalomania” than what Freud thought (after the Copernican and the Darwinian revolutions) to be “the third and most wounding blow,” namely the (alleged) discovery by psychoanalysis that the ego “is not even master in its own house.”²³⁹ What Freud referred to is at best a narcissistic wound on the *semantic* level, which is psychologically harmless, indeed irrelevant. But the fact that not we, as human beings, have to experience the individuation process (to stay with this example), but that the *concept* of man is what has to undergo it, is a *logical* or *syntactical* offence that is ipso facto a real psychological wound. And *practically* it means that the psychologist must not allow himself to have a soft spot, a narcissistic tendermindedness, for his own or our collectively cherished ideals, values, and dogmas (that is, for “the ego”; for “the ego” is nothing else but our most precious ideals,

²³⁹ See Sigmund Freud, *Introductory Lectures*, no. 18, Standard Edition vol. 15, pp. 284 f. Critically we can say that the insight that the ego is not master in its own house is nothing new, not at all revolutionary. Religious thinking had taught this all along, although of course not in the same Freudian positivistic terms and on the same scientific basis. Just think of: “For the good that I would I do not; but the evil which I would not, that I do” (Romans 7:19). “For it is God which worketh in you both to will and to do of his good pleasure” (Phil. 2:13). Philosophy likewise had taught that to begin with we tend to be the slaves of our affects and emotions, which is why man’s ethical task was to painfully struggle to rise above his dependence in order to thus become a “wise man.” There is here no megalomaniac ego for whom the insight that it is not the master in its own house could have been a shocking surprise and “the most wounding blow.” For centuries or millennia the traditional ego had grown up with the very insight that Freud now for the first time *sells* as this terrible blow to man’s self-love, thereby against appearances precisely for the first time *installing* and *edifying* this fundamentally modern narcissistic ego. Because by presenting this familiar insight as such an unheard-of wound he teaches consciousness to view it all of a sudden as something terribly wrong and ipso facto for the first time creates that majestic unwounded position for which alone this insight could be a terribly humiliating blow. Ostensibly Freud wants to teach us humility, but in truth and unwittingly—on the psychological or syntactical level—he erects the very megalomaniac stance that he ostensibly—on the semantic level—undoes.

interests, and beliefs). Psychology is not for sissies, not for “Beautiful Souls.” One has to be able to take it, where “it” here refers to the ruthless truths brought about by the objective *soul movement* or contained in soul phenomena. Ruthless truths as they manifested, for example, in ancient times in cruel rituals like human sacrifices or in more modern times in the fundamental ruptures and losses brought about by scientific and technological progress and the painful collapse of our traditional values and beliefs. And, at least to the extent that one is a psychologist (not necessarily, however, to the extent that one is civil man and private individual), one has to firmly, unperturbedly hold one’s place vis-à-vis the soul’s ruthlessness, allowing the painful soul contents to come home to oneself (as psychologist), to cut into one’s flesh, and to transform, redefine, (psychology’s) consciousness (rather than protecting psychology’s habitual consciousness from them by insisting on one’s old values or than “regressively restoring its persona”). Professionalism: no pity and solidarity with the desperate wish of the ego, identified with the *anima alba*, to retain its subjectivism, its innocence, and its aestheticism.

- The particular *procedere* of the psychological approach is an absolute-negative inwardization, a *recursive* progression.²⁴⁰ It is a relentless movement into the initially hidden (“implicit”) depth of the phenomenon at hand via successive logical negations (the self-negations of the phenomenon’s first immediacy and its subsequent preliminary appearances) so that what it contains in its depth is made explicit, is brought to light, released into its truth (into its *being true*: “verification”),

²⁴⁰ I will not discuss this here any further since I have given detailed illustrations of this procedure, for example, in my discussion of the Glass-Mountain fairy tale (W. Giegerich, D.L. Miller, G. Mogenson, *Dialectics & Analytical Psychology*, New Orleans, LA [Spring Journal Books] 2005, pp. 9–24), of Heraclitus’s dictum about the depth of the soul (“Is the Soul ‘Deep’? Entering and Following the Logical Movement of Heraclitus’ Fragment 45 (Diels),” now ch. 6 of my *The Soul Always Thinks*, vol. 4 of my Collected English Papers, New Orleans, LA [Spring Journal Books] 2010), and elsewhere.

through its being integrated into consciousness, that is to say, into consciousness as consciousness's own logical form, its very constitution.

- The translocation to the viewpoint *sub specie* of the objective soul is a methodological step, and yet it is not completely in our hands. To some extent it is *dependent on one's having been reached by* the soul in the Real, reached by "the other side." So that a person can be reached by the soul (in such a way that his or her eyes are opened to it, in contrast to a merely being reached by its effects in the form of symptoms), a particular organ must be present in that person: the organ of feeling. This is not so common. Of course, emotional reactions, affective reactions, and feelings are quite common. But, as we already heard, having feelings and emotions is something completely different from the organ of feeling and, of course, also from what Jung called the feeling function, which is a rational function and not an emotional outburst or the event of "having feelings." Many people in psychology speak of feeling and the feeling function, but they do not know it. Jung was of the opinion that (a) everybody had a feeling function, even though in some cases only as an "inferior function," that is, a merely rudimentary or dormant one in need of being developed. I do not think so, at least concerning what I call the organ of feeling: In many people it is simply absent. Jung also was of the opinion that (b) the feeling function and the thinking function mutually exclude each other. Again, while this may be the case for his concept of them, it is not true for true thinking and true feeling. Doing psychology requires that the person who does it does it from a point, a depth, in which thinking and feeling are one. The German word *Gemüt* in the older language, and almost up to recent times, used to denote precisely the unity of feeling, thinking, and volition, the unity of St. Augustine's trinity (triunity) of *memoria*, *intellectus*, and

voluntas.²⁴¹ It comprises heart or soul and reason and understanding (*mens, animus*). The *Gemüt* in this sense is the "whole man" (*homo totus*) in his *inwardness*, his inner depth, as his dwelling within himself (in contrast to in the body). The real issue here, of course, is not the word "*Gemüt*" itself, but the indifference point, which alone can function as the organ in us to do psychology. "Depth psychology" does not merely mean that it is a psychology that studies *the depths* as its object. Rather, it requires that it be *performed*, not from the level of separate "functions" (in Jung's sense), but from a deeper level, that of the indifference point in which conceptual thought and true feeling go together. The objective soul needs as its counterpart and addressee in the human subject this organ. Only if it were in reality the organ of psychological work could the terrible abstractness prevailing in the psychology as it really exists be overcome, an abstractness that expresses itself in thoughts as deep as a puddle, whose shallowness and murkiness is often merely covered over by a likewise abstract emotionalism devoid of, but given out as, true feeling. This hollow emotionalism comes out most blatantly in the use of hollow power-words such as "the sacred," "the numinous," "the Gods"

Here I end my brief outlining of some of the major methodological prerequisites for doing psychology. But I do not want to leave this discussion without pointing out that as far as therapeutic work with actual patients is concerned things are more complicated than presented here because in the practice of therapy we must be *utriusque capax* (capable of both), as alchemy said of the Mercurius. As practicing *therapists* we are not totally identical with the psychologist in ourselves. We must have one leg in psychology and one leg in practical reality, the sphere of the human, all-too-human. We must be able to display a true unadulterated access to soul as well as a practical knowledge of the world (which includes a realistic insight into human nature) and understand the needs of the patient as human being. And, this is most

²⁴¹ See *Grimm'sches Wörterbuch*, sub voce "Gemüt," vol. 5, col. 3293 ff., here especially col. 3296.

important, we have to *know when it is a question of the one and when of the other*. Some patients are open to soul work right from the beginning or at least at certain times of their analytical work. Some patients, by contrast, do not need much psychology in the true sense of the word. What they need is rather much down-to-earth help, such as real human attention, sympathy, and understanding; an *honest* face-to-face encounter with another human being; guidance through personal crises or difficult life situations, or more generally a kind of philosophical practical wisdom,²⁴² and so on. Already Jung wisely distinguished four stages (and this also means four possible projects) of psychotherapy, namely *confession*, *instruction* [Aufklärung], *education*, and *transformation* (CW 16 § 122 ff.). Only with Jung's last category would we reach the precincts of psychology proper. So while I do not wish to water down in any way the severe requirements presented above for doing psychology, a psychology *with* soul, I also do not want to absolutize psychology, as if in the consulting room nothing but psychology was permitted. Just as I do not confuse myself as private individual, as "civil man," with the psychologist that (I hope) I am.

²⁴² Marco Heleno Barreto, "It is something like antique philosophy": Analytical Psychology and Philosophical Practical Wisdom," in: *Spring* 77 ("Philosophy & Psychology"), Spring 2007, pp. 79–98.

 CHAPTER 4

The Phenomenology of the Soul (3): The two opposite purposes (directions, teleologies) of the soul

Having just mentioned the situation and needs in the consulting room I have to introduce one further crucial distinction which again complicates matters considerably, the distinction between two fundamentally different, indeed opposite, purposes, aims, or directions of the soul's logical life. This distinction is not only of importance in practical psychotherapy, but also with respect to the general theory (or a full understanding) of the nature of the soul as such and its *opus magnum*. In therapy this distinction again requires that we are capable of knowing *when* it is a question of the one direction and *when* of the other.

When we look at psychological phenomenology we can see that there are two very different, even opposite intentionalities, *concerning what "the soul" wants to bring about in humans*, intentionalities that express themselves in the psychologically relevant phenomena and in the soul's life in general. There are the purposes of